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1 |  INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, in many respects, caught European govern-
ments off guard. Not only was the severity of the disease unclear in the early stages of the crisis, but 
Europe had also “dodged the bullet” during previous health crises, including the swine flu pandemic 
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COVID-19 presented Europe with an, in many respects, un-
precedented challenge. While the virus proved itself to be 
transnational in nature, not taking heed of borders, govern-
ment responses were largely national. Still, governments soon 
found themselves engaged in complex multi-level policy coop-
eration at the national, subnational, and supranational levels. 
This paper looks at the crisis response in the Low Countries 
(Belgium and the Netherlands) to understand the impact of 
this process on the political system. We argue that efficient 
multi-level policy cooperation in both countries has run up 
against the limits of existing institutions, leading to significant 
political grievances. In Belgium, slow negotiation between the 
central and regional governments has put the federal system 
in question. In the Netherlands, meanwhile, the absence of 
European institutions tasked with fiscal policy coordination 
has increased the salience of the EU fiscal sphere once again.
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of 2009–2010 (Versluis et al., 2019), leaving many governments to initially underestimate the risk 
posed by coronavirus (Capano, 2020).
In this paper, we trace the policy response in Belgium and the Netherlands to COVID-19. As small 
and densely populated open economies, the Low Countries1 have been among the countries hardest hit 
by the pandemic in Europe. Between March and September 2020, excess mortality in the Netherlands 
stood at around 10,203 while Belgium had suffered over 8,000 excess deaths. Unsurprisingly then, the 
political fallout of the crisis has been substantial in both countries. What is perhaps most surprising, 
however, is that the public discourse in both countries has not focused on matters of health care to a 
large degree, but it has rather focused on broader issues of governance, as we shall see. We explain 
this puzzling lack of focus on health care, amid the largest health crisis the Low Countries have experi-
enced in decades, by examining the problems of multi-level governance that the COVID-19 crisis has 
exposed for these countries. The crisis has laid bare the fact that both countries experience challenges 
when it comes to finding an optimal allocation and complementarity of tasks between different levels 
of government. In this regard, we show how the federal system in Belgium caused fatal holdups in 
decision making throughout the early stages of the pandemic, while the incompleteness of Europe's 
fiscal institutions allowed negotiations within the Dutch government to become bogged down.
The coronavirus pandemic has presented policymakers with a complex set of challenges. COVID-
19, like similar global health emergencies that went before it, such as the Spanish flu of 1918 and the 
swine flu pandemic, is a transboundary and multilevel policy problem (Boin et al., 2009; Versluis 
et al., 2019). That is, the virus does not stop at administrative and regulatory borders and presents 
policy challenges that require cooperation between governments both horizontally that operate “at 
different territorial levels” (Bache and Flinders 2004, p3; Thomann et al., 2019). That is, the virus 
requires the executives of neighboring countries, as well as local, regional, and national governments 
within any given country to work together. Such cooperation is of course notoriously tricky to estab-
lish (Olson, 1982; Putnam, 1988; Scharpf, 2006). We argue that the COVID-19 crisis has aggravated 
politically sensitive problems of multi-level governance, albeit in different ways, in both Belgium and 
the Netherlands. In the former, the population woke up to the realization that Belgium's federal model 
with its fragmented policy portfolios had left the country with no fewer than nine ministers for health. 
As a result, the Belgian crisis response has been riddled with coordination problems which have (re)
ignited a debate about the future sustainability of the country's federal model. In the Netherlands, 
meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has come under major scrutiny in public discourse. Calls for 
European fiscal solidarity coming from the countries that had been most affected by the pandemic, 
mostly in southern Europe, paired with a lack of institutionalized resources at the European level to 
deal with the fiscal aspects of the pandemic, led to an increase in the salience of the EU’s role in fiscal 
policy in Dutch public discourse. The crisis has therefore sparked debate on the subject of multilevel 
policy cooperation in both countries, as current institutional arrangements have run into problems of 
complementarity and regarding the allocation of tasks between different levels of government.
In what follows, we will first present a short overview of the crisis response in the Low Countries. 
We will then review both countries’ crisis experiences from a comparative perspective. In each case, 
we will sketch how the health crisis has morphed into a crisis of institutions—of a national nature in 
the case of Belgium and a transnational one in the case of the Netherlands.
2 |  THE BELGIAN AND DUTCH RESPONSE TO 
THE CRISIS
Belgium and the Netherlands are both small open economies with a relatively high population density that 
boast similar continental welfare models (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001). Given these 
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similarities, it should come as no surprise that the Low Countries’ initial responses to the COVID-19 crisis 
were strikingly similar in terms of content and timing (as reviewed in section 2.1). As far as economic 
measures go, both countries broke the bank for a fiscal stimulus to help smoothen the economic hardship 
of their populations, although Belgium focused more on liquidity guarantees whereas the Dutch approach 
was more oriented toward direct fiscal stimulus, which we discuss in section 2.2.
2.1 | Healthcare measures
Belgium and the Netherlands both suffered  their first COVID-19-related death in the week begin-
ning March 02. The response of both governments, however, had been somewhat lackluster up to 
that point. Both national governments had stressed that there was no need to cancel national events 
or to take other measures to prevent the spread of the virus.2 Mark Rutte, the Dutch Prime Minister, 
infamously, shook the hand of the national coordinator of infectious diseases while announcing the 
Dutch official no handshake policy.3
This wait-and-see approach quickly changed once the number of cases accelerated (see Figure 1). 
Unsurprisingly, the pattern of cases in these neighboring countries is nearly identical. Both countries 
experienced their first cases in March, followed by an exponential growth of cases from mid-March to 
mid-April, at which point the measures that were introduced started to “flatten the curve” of the virus.
As mentioned previously, the Belgian and Dutch governments followed near-identical timelines in 
their response against the disease. Once the seriousness of the pandemic became clear in early March, 
both governments took unprecedented steps to try to halt the spread of the virus. The Netherlands 
started by canceling events of more than 100 people and by closing schools, day care facilities, restau-
rants, bars, and sports facilities on March 12 and March 13. Belgium followed suit by announcing 
almost identical measures  on  March 17.4 There  were only two notable differences in the sanitary 
responses. Firstly, the Netherlands never banned outside sports and was quick to reopen shops pro-
vided a COVID-19 protocol was adhered to. Belgium, on the other hand, prohibited all non-essential 
travel and only reopened non-essential shops two months later.
Both countries also pursued a similar phased reopening strategy. In the Netherlands schools, day-
care facilities, libraries, and other public facilities were reopened on May 11 while Belgium similarly 
allowed schools and public transport to resume business on the same day.5 Over the following weeks, 
public life in both countries officially restarted as non-essential travel was again allowed and restau-
rants, cafes, and gyms started to reopen. In both cases, reopening was subject to strict sanitary proto-
cols (e.g., in Belgium restaurants were obliged to ensure a minimum spacing of 1.5m between tables).
As described above, Dutch and Belgian healthcare measures were at times mirror images of each 
other. This is also illustrated by the stringency index (data from the Oxford Blavatnik School) in 
Figure  2 below. From mid-March onwards, the two governments put nearly identical measures in 
place at almost the same time and equally followed a similar phased approach to the reopening of the 
economy and society from the 11 May onwards.
2.2 | Economic measures
The fiscal stimulus response enacted by both governments, as was the case with health care, was quite 
similar, the main difference being that the Netherlands opted for a larger direct fiscal impulse and 
has allowed more deferrals (such as tax deferrals or grace periods on the repayments of government-
issued loans). Belgium on the other hand focused on liquidity guarantees, as can be seen in Table 1 
below.6
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F I G U R E  1  New cases in Belgium and the Netherlands. Source: COVID-19, Our World in Data (Oxford 
University)
F I G U R E  2  Stringency index of Belgian and Dutch lockdown measures. Source: COVID-19, Our World in Data 
(Oxford University)
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In Belgium, the direct fiscal impulse came mostly from the federal level of government; benefits 
have been increased, temporary unemployment schemes extended, and grants were made available 
to independent workers. Moreover, VAT was canceled for all restaurants and cafes and all employees 
were given a €300 cheque to consume in restaurants. The federal Belgian government has also allowed 
for the deferral of tax payments and business loans, and mortgage loans received a “holiday” of six 
months. With regard to other liquidity guarantees, the federal government carved out €50 billion for 
additional credit with a maximum maturity of twelve months guaranteed by banks, with the exception 
of loan refinancing. Moreover, the federal government has itself started to extend loan guarantees.
The Belgian regional governments have also provided further stimulus. The government of 
Wallonia pledged a €5,000 one-off payment to SMEs that had been forced to closed, introduced so-
called “ricochet loans” (with government guarantees and low interest rates aimed at a quick economic 
restart) for independent workers, and proposed a deferral of loan repayments to government institu-
tions (i.e., with respect to social housing). The package offered by the Flemish government was more 
comprehensive and included a one-off payment of €4,000 for SMEs that had been forced to shut and 
an additional €160 for every day the businesses remained closed after April 04. Moreover, the Flemish 
government also extended emergency subsidies to heavily affected sectors such as culture and tourism. 
Additionally, the government, next to a standard loan guarantee scheme, intervened to pay utility bills 
for those falling into unemployment, and the government also promises tax deferrals (e.g., for road 
tax) and deferrals to government-issued loans (e.g., for start-ups and social housing). Furthermore, 
the Flemish government created the government-backed welvaartsfonds or welfare fund, which would 
seek to support Flemish businesses by allowing citizens to invest their savings with a tax break as an 
incentive. Lastly, Brussels’ regional government also promised emergency funding to the healthcare 
sector and a one-off grant of €4,000 for SMEs that had been forced to shut down, €2,000 for those that 
had to partially close, and a public guarantee for business loans.
The Netherlands announced its first lockdown measures on 17 March. The direct fiscal impulse 
enacted by the Dutch government in the early months of the crisis amounted to €29.7 billion and 
primarily consisted of an emergency measure designed to foster employment called Noodmaatregel 
Overbrugging voor Werkgelegenheid or NOW. NOW is €20 billion investment program intended to 
keep people employed during the crisis. To avoid misuse, companies will receive a 150% fine if they 
lay off a worker while making use of the scheme—this fine was later reduced to 100%. In addition to 
NOW, the government handed out a total of €2.45 billion to help independent workers overcome the 
crisis and a lump sum of €4,000 for businesses that were forced to close down due to government reg-
ulations—as had been introduced in the Netherlands. Furthermore, healthcare spending was increased 
by €800 million and both the agricultural and culture sectors received grants.
Next to the direct fiscal impulse, the Netherlands issued €64 billion in tax deferrals for six months 
relating to VAT, income tax, wage tax, and corporate tax. Other liquidity measures amount to around 
€30 billion as additional credit was made available through banks backed by the government. The 
Dutch government also, somewhat controversially, issued large loans to Dutch multinationals such as 
T A B L E  1  Fiscal response to the corona crisis
Direct fiscal impulse Deferral
Other liquidity 
guarantee
Belgium 1.4% 4.8% 21.9%
Netherlands 3.7% 7.9% 3.4%
Source: Bruegel.
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KLM and Booking.com which have made the subsidies offered to other heavily affected sectors (i.e., 
the cultural sector) pale in comparison.
In short, in the early months of the pandemic, both Belgium and the Netherlands pursued an es-
sentially identical lockdown strategy following a highly similar timeline. Moreover, the governments 
have put together relatively comprehensive economic packages in order to off-set the high economic 
costs incurred by the shutdown of social life in the Low Countries. The COVID-19 crisis has nev-
ertheless exacted a heavy toll in the Low Countries. In terms of excess mortality, Belgium and the 
Netherlands have suffered over 8,000 and 10,203 deaths, respectively, between March and September 
2020. Yet, in spite of suffering a per capita death toll multiple times higher than neighboring countries 
such as Denmark of Germany, the political fallout of the COVID-19 crisis in the Low Countries has 
so far not been dominated by questions of healthcare. In the following sections, we will take a closer 
look at how the crisis unfolded in Belgium and the Netherlands. We will argue that while institutional 
overgrow thwarted efficient policy cooperation in Belgium, the absence of such mechanisms at the 
European level to deal with multilevel fiscal questions has equally opened the door to pollicization of 
the COVID-19 crisis in the Netherlands.
3 |  BELGIUM: FEDERALISM’S REVENGE
When COVID-19 first reared its head in Belgium in late February 2020, the country had been without 
a governing majority since December 2018. The Michel I cabinet (2014–2018) had been, in part, built 
on an agreement to postpone dealing with outstanding communitarian issues surrounding the coun-
try's federal system. However, this entente had left the Flemish nationalist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie/
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)—a constituent part of the governing coalition—exposed on its right 
flank by the Vlaams Belang/ Flemish Interest party which saw N-VA opt for an early exit in antici-
pation of elections in May 2019. Almost a year on, these elections had not yet yielded a majority 
government. The essential problem in these negotiations was the highly contradictory voting behavior 
of Flemish and Walloon voters, with the former preferring nationalist right-wing parties in greater 
numbers while the center-left Parti socialiste/Socialist Party (PS) dominates in Wallonia. The crisis 
did, nevertheless, provide a strong impetus to restart negotiations with the aim of expanding the 
caretaker government under Prime Minister Sophie Wilmès and to reach a majority for a potential 
Wilmès II cabinet with full legislative power to tackle the virus.7 While several attempts to obtain a 
majority fell short, a solution was found on March 16 in the form of a temporary minority government 
with confidence-and-supply approach offered by all parties excluding the Flemish nationalist N.VA 
and Vlaams Belang, but including the hard-left Parti de Travail de Belgique/ Partij van de Arbeid 
van België/ Workers’ Party of Belgium (PTB/PVDA).8 On top of its expanded legislative power, the 
newly created Wilmès II cabinet was also given emergency decree powers for a period of six months, 
allowing the government to circumvent the traditional parliamentary legislative procedures across a 
range of policy areas and to formulate an effective crisis response. By most standards, this created 
an extraordinary situation, with a minority cabinet ruling by emergency decree. A deal was  there-
fore  struck between parliament and government by which a “super cabinet” would be convened, 
bringing together all party leaders (excluding the leaders of PTB/PVDA and Vlaams Belang) to take 
stock of the developing situation on a weekly basis.9 Crisis management therefore became an effort 
that, to an extent, bridged the typically trenchant party divides in Belgium.
While the crisis response has generated some rare political good will at the national level between 
political rivals in Belgium, attempts at tackling the aforementioned multilevel policy problem have 
nevertheless run up against the limits of the country's federal system. The first problems, arguably, 
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arose even before the emergence of COVID-19. The Belgian federal government has traditionally 
held stocks of personal protective equipment (PPE). Unfortunately, decay meant this stock needed to 
be destroyed in 2018.10 Rather than replenishing these reserves, the then caretaker Wilmès I govern-
ment decided it would wait before implementing an overhaul of its strategic stock system, preparing 
a move to a market-based model. These plans had not yet been brought to a conclusion by the start 
of 2020, in part due to the legislative limits imposed on the caretaker government. When COVID-19 
hit Belgium, this meant health services quickly ran low on stocks of PPE, leaving the government 
scrambling to find suppliers on the international markets. Even before the crisis started, therefore, the 
structural challenges imposed by the federal system on government formation had already compli-
cated Belgium's crisis response.
While government formation has traditionally been a tricky exercise in Belgium, the biggest obsta-
cle to policy response has arguably related to the coordination of policy between the different govern-
ments in the federal state. Belgium has a complex structure of interlocking competencies (Deschouwer 
& Reuchamps, 2013; Swenden & Theo Jans, 2006) involving the federal government and the coun-
try's regions and communities.11 As a result, as mentioned above, the country boasts nine ministers 
responsible for different aspects of health policy (or almost 1 for every million inhabitants). Mounting 
a coherent policy response among these highly interdependent governments was therefore contingent 
on regular inter-ministerial conferences and communication that brought together these nine health 
ministers and other cabinet members with adjacent portfolios.12 This setup has proved rigid and has 
been further hindered by the expansion of the country's case definition—the term used by medical 
professionals to adjudicate when it is appropriate to test for COVID-19—partly to make efficient use 
of scarce testing capacities.13 However, both this definition and the decision on which testing facilities 
would be authorized to carry out tests required inter-ministerial approval, thereby delaying the expan-
sion of testing capacities even further. While these were highly technical and not particularly salient 
political issues, this time-consuming policy process nevertheless allowed the virus to spread relatively 
unmonitored in the early weeks of the pandemic in Belgium.
Perhaps most revealing of all is the case of Belgium's test-and-trace policy.14 While a tracing call 
center was established in cooperation between the regions and the federal government, there remained 
much confusion about who was responsible for the development of a possible contact-tracing mobile 
phone application. This caused significant friction between stakeholders at the inter-ministerial con-
ferences until the Council of State (Belgium's supreme administrative court) quashed a federal legisla-
tive initiative on the matter judging any such application to involve preventative health care, which was 
the domain of the devolved regional governments.15 Continuous devolution over decades has created 
a maze of interlocking competences in Belgium (Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013; Swenden, 2013; 
Swenden & Theo Jans, 2006). This system has proved both too fragmented to foster an agile policy 
response to the multilevel health challenge of COVID-19 and too complex for even the government 
itself to navigate in times of urgency.
In spite of the significant cross-party cooperation that can be observed at the outset of the crisis, the 
virus subsequently reignited the highly contentious debate about the structure and raison d'etre of the 
Belgian state itself (Reuchamps, 2011; Swenden & Theo Jans, 2006). Belgium's federal minister for 
health, Maggie De Block, openly acknowledged the fact that the fragmentation of competencies came 
at the cost of lives, calling  the process “playing Wimbeldon in slow-motion.”16 Perhaps most tell-
ingly, then the prime minister herself, Sophie Wilmès, quoting former Prime Minister Yves Leterme, 
claimed that Belgium's current federal decision making system was “running on its last fumes.” In 
doing so, Wilmès has become the first major Walloon politician to openly call into question the con-
tinued existence of the current federal model,17 espousing the idea of centralizing key policy domains.
8 |   VAN OVERBEKE ANd STAdIG
The debate is therefore arguably set up to be more complex than heretofore. Whereas past waves of 
constitutional reform had generally focused on increased devolution, the shortcomings of Belgium's 
multilevel response to COVID-19 is now being seized by parties across the span of Belgian politics to 
argue both for devolution and for the centralization of competencies. The very architects of the federal 
system (i.e., the Flemish Christian democrats and the liberals on both sides of the language divide) 
have started to reconsider the appeal of a stronger federal government. Aside from administrative ar-
guments for such centralization (which are particularly important for the liberals), these new positions 
are also an attempt to offer a political alternative to the rise of the Flemish nationalist right in recent 
decades. For these nationalist parties, then, COVID-19 is seen as an opportunity to push for fully 
regionalized health care and social security. The Walloon PS party, finally, has been ambiguous in its 
position regarding constitutional change. Notably, it has opened the door to possible changes, in what 
has been seen as a trade-off to secure its socioeconomic priorities in the ongoing government talks. 
So, in Belgium, the crisis has led to discussions on what the optimal allocation of tasks is between 
the country's different levels of government, with increased centralization and further devolution on 
the agenda.
The COVID-19 crisis, then, has left Belgium in a difficult predicament. The small open economy 
was struck hard by the health crisis, in spite of pursuing strong lockdown measures. What is more, 
the political fallout of the emergency has again exposed the structural weaknesses at the heart of the 
country's existing federal model. Political parties have started to position themselves to move into the 
inevitable post-COVID-19 relaunch of government formations talks. If anything, the re-emergence of 
these communitarian issues onto the agenda, as well as the increased salience of socioeconomic policy 
to tackle the crisis, will further complicate, the already complex, formation talks.
4 |  THE NETHERLANDS: BEING FRUGAL DOESN’T 
COME CHEAP
In contrast to Belgium, the Netherlands has experienced a period of domestic political stability over 
recent years. Mark Rutte, the country's current prime minister, has headed three consecutive govern-
ments since 2010, the last two of which have not been dissolved prematurely. This is notable given the 
highly fragmented nature of the Dutch House of Representatives, and the number of crises that have 
hit during Rutte's tenure, including the financial, euro, refugee, and COVID crises. Each of these epi-
sodes actually saw support for Rutte's leadership grow (Bovens & Wille, 2008; Van Lieshout, 2020), 
whereas support for European fiscal solidarity—which would involve a pooling of common resources 
at EU level to be distributed centrally, independently of the member states—has decreased. Each cri-
sis listed above also required fiscal cooperation between governments operating at different territorial 
levels (Bache & Flinders 2004, 3; Thomann et al., 2019). In the absence of an effective mechanism to 
deal with multilevel policy coordination in fiscal matters at EU level, each crisis would entail lengthy 
negotiations on emergency measures at the level of the European Council. Multilevel policy coordina-
tion in fiscal matters could entail the introduction of a fully fledged fiscal union, which could include 
a European Minister of Finance or a spending capacity for the European Commission. As discussed 
by Camous and Claeys (2020), the lack of such institutions only exacerbates existing tensions in the 
EU. As a traditionally “fiscally hawkish” EU member state, the Netherlands is likely to only continue 
playing two-level games (Putnam, 1988), a situation in which the Dutch government would negotiate 
at the international level by setting the limits of a possible deal in its own parliament, thereby tying its 
hands in the international negotiations, and further fueling Dutch Euroscepticism.
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Since the outset of the COVID-19 crisis in February, Dutch voters have “rallied around the flag” 
(Mueller, 1970) and Rutte's popularity has soared. In contrast to the euro crisis, when the Netherlands 
were a vocal supporter of the EU’s austerity agenda, the response to the current crisis has been sur-
prisingly Keynesian. Minister for Finance Wopke Hoekstra stated that “the boom, not the slump is 
the right time for austerity”18: The Netherlands announced stimulus packages worth around 15% of 
GDP19 and national debt is expected to rise from 48% of GDP before the pandemic to around 75% of 
GDP in its wake. The focus of the national stimulus package has primarily been on employment and 
on subsidizing companies in heavily exposed sectors, as was the case in Belgium and throughout much 
of Europe. This approach and the restrictive measures that were designed to “flatten the curve” of the 
virus have the approval of an overwhelming majority of the Dutch electorate, with only voters of right-
wing anti-establishment parties Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) and Forum voor Democratie (FvD) 
tending to disagree with the government's approach to the crisis,20 and Rutte's liberal Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) was able to ride on an enormous wave of support throughout the early 
months of the pandemic.
Meanwhile, the EU has come under major scrutiny in the Netherlands. Calls for European fis-
cal solidarity from the countries that were most badly affected by the pandemic, mostly in southern 
Europe, and the lack of institutional resources at EU level to deal with the fiscal aspect of the COVID-
19 crisis, have led to an increase in the salience of the EU fiscal sphere in the Netherlands and to the 
aforementioned two-level game (Putnam, 1988).
The cabinet's initial response to calls for a Europe-wide approach to tackle the pandemic was that 
the COVID-19 crisis was not a collective responsibility, but rather one for individual countries, as 
health care is almost exclusively a national competence. Hence, so argued the Dutch government, EU 
spending would only be legitimized if it was to compensate for increasing healthcare costs.21 Moreover, 
Minister for Finance Wopke Hoekstra argued that additional financing should always be in the form of 
loans with conditions for economic reform attached, similar to those loans distributed to crisis-stricken 
countries during the euro crisis. Hoekstra's comments were met with outrage by his southern coun-
terparts,22 and even former Dutch Finance Minister and Eurogroup President Jeroen “Schnapps und 
Frauen” Dijsselbloem23 argued that Hoekstra's stance was unnecessarily harsh.24 However, Hoekstra 
and Rutte doubled down on their stance while consulting with the Dutch House of Representatives. 
All parties except the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA/Dutch Labour Party) and GroenLinks (GL/greens) 
agreed with the stance of the government, and were opposed to the prospect of European bonds, 
calling for loans only to be offered with conditions for economic reform attached.25 Thus, Hoekstra 
and Rutte reaffirmed their negotiation position by organizing a vote in parliament, thereby creating a 
classic two-level game (Putnam, 1988).
The EU deal that was reached on April 0926 was in line with what the Dutch government and parlia-
ment wanted, namely a €500 billion stimulus package consisting of European Investment Bank funds 
and loans from the European Stability Mechanism to be used mostly to cover increasing healthcare 
costs and unemployment schemes in the member states that had been hit hardest by the pandemic.27
Given the government's initial stance and the position of the Dutch parliament, it should come as 
no surprise that Rutte and Hoekstra were displeased with and outright rejected the plan of Merkel and 
Macron for a €750 billion European investment that would be partly financed by the issuing of com-
mon bonds at EU level.28 However, Rutte and the other “frugals” (Austria, Denmark, and Sweden) 
compromised to support the second EU deal29 on July 21, which includes grants and loans, partly 
financed by jointly issued bonds. Notably, the frugal countries did not support the program before 
grants were cut from €500 billion to €390 and before budget rebates were reinstated.
The Dutch stance regarding European fiscal issues is not new. Ever since the UK voted to leave 
the EU in 2016, Rutte has spearheaded the resistance of the so-called frugal countries against any 
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increases in European spending. This increased the salience of European fiscal policy and, by ex-
tension, strengthened the notion that the northern member states, and the Netherlands in particular, 
have borne disproportionate financial costs for recent European crises. Moreover, the Dutch elections 
are on the horizon in March 2021. Thus, Rutte does not want his recently built-up political capital 
to disappear into thin air, and he is aware that the likes of FvD and PVV will be ready to pounce as 
soon as Rutte's VVD or other coalition parties adopt a more generous and forgiving stance regarding 
European fiscal issues.
The current health-turned-fiscal crisis has therefore once again aggravated the sentiment in the 
Netherlands that the European North should not be responsible for southern countries that are some-
times characterized as “fiscally profligate,” which has increased the salience of European fiscal policy 
in the country's public discourse once again. In the absence of a more effective allocation between 
national and European levels of government, the Dutch will likely keep playing two-level games. 
What's more, the salience of the EU fiscal sphere is likely to keep increasing in the Netherlands with 
increased levels of Euroscepticism following on its heels if this dynamic persists.
5 |  CONCLUSION
Since it first appeared in Europe in Italy in February 2020, COVID-19 has hit Europe hard, infecting 
more than 2.300.000 people and killing an estimated 187.000 between January and June 2020. These 
staggering figures leave little doubt that COVID-19 has presented the continent, and indeed the world, 
with a transboundary problem (Boin et al., 2009) requiring effective multi-level policy coordination 
between governments (Versluis, 2019). Such effective cooperation, like any form of collective action, 
is a tricky exercise (Olson, 1982; Putnam, 1988; Scharpf, 2006; Tsebelis, 2002) in which satisfactory 
conclusions are often reliant on strong institutions. In this paper, we have compared the crisis response 
in Belgium and the Netherlands in order to understand why it is that their comparatively severe health 
crises did not trigger much debate about health policy. We argue that for the Low Countries, the virus 
has exposed the limits of effective policy coordination for some governance systems.
Belgium and the Netherlands have, in many respects, had a similar crisis experience. Both countries 
suspended social life in mid-March, implemented similarly ambitious fiscal packages and reopened 
their societies in a phased way that followed a comparable timetable. Belgium and the Netherlands 
have also been regrettably comparable in their public health outcomes as the countries suffered rela-
tively high death tolls. However, in spite of this high cost, the political debate following the COVID 
crisis has hardly centered around health care as such. Rather, for both countries the post-COVID 
political landscape has been shaped by the difficulties encountered by multi-level policymaking. As 
Fieldhouse et al. (2020) have argued, crises tend to influence what is on voter's minds. In the Low 
Countries, COVID-19 has arguably done exactly this by  stirring up already lingering institutional 
questions as their crisis was marked by the issues and shortcomings of multi-level policymaking.
Still, despite their similarities, this story has been quite different for each of the Low Countries. In 
the Netherlands, broad satisfaction with domestic institutions and the crisis response, and impending 
elections has allowed the incumbent Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to leverage the absence of 
effective institutions for fiscal coordination in the EU to his own advantage. As we discussed, this 
Dutch political gamesmanship is a structural and institutional question as opposed to mere coinci-
dence. That is, the absence of solid European fiscal institutions leaves the door open for governments 
to exploit the need for fiscal cooperation exactly when it is at its greatest. Crisis policymaking in a 
multilevel context, therefore, requires a minimum level of institutionalization for optimal outcomes to 
be reached and for unwanted pollicization to be minimized. Belgium, on the other hand, has not even 
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been afforded the luxury to be at odds with Europe. Rather, as the national government's response to 
the health crisis was thwarted by its complex federal system, the public debate has been dominated by 
the question of what is next for its strained federal system. In contrast to the case of the Dutch policy 
on European fiscal redistribution, Belgium shows us that having too many institutions can equally 
frustrate effective crisis governance. To be sure, this is hardly a new issue on the political agenda in 
Belgium, but the crisis has clearly highlighted the federal question in the country.
Thus, in light of these cases, it may be asked if regional demands can be married to efficiency? For 
the Low Countries, COVID-19 has not just presented itself as an unprecedented health crisis. Rather, 
debate about the nature of governance has drawn attention away from some of the pertinent questions 
of health care. In the Low Countries, the virus has exposed the limitations of current institutions 
and has sparked a debate on the optimal allocation of tasks between different levels of government. 
Precisely, this lack of effective multi-level policy cooperation in times of crisis has led to high-stakes 
political games, as these cases have shown.
ORCID
Toon Van Overbeke   https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0620-9943 
ENDNOTES
 1 While the Low Countries is a region in Western Europe bordering the North Sea comprising Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Luxembourg, it should be noted that this paper focuses only on Belgium and the Netherlands. 
 2 De Tijd ( https://www.tijd.be/polit iek-econo mie/belgi e/feder aal/maggie-de-block-er-is-veel-panie kzaai erij/10211 
960.html). 
 3 The video went viral on Twitter and can be seen here: https://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=pAMsI gzXIjo 
 4 De Tijd (https://www.tijd.be/dossi ers/coron aviru s/stren gere-maatr egelen-in-belgie-tot-5-april/ 214892.html). 
 5 Belgian Government, National Security Council. (https://www.belgi um.be/nl/nieuw s/2020/maatr egelen_van_de_
natio nale_veili gheid sraad_van_24_april_2020). 
 6 Breugel Thinktank ( https://www.brueg el.org/publi catio ns/datas ets/covid-natio nal-datas et/). 
 7 VRT-Niewus (https://www.vrt.be/vrtnw s/nl/2020/03/15/onder hande lingen-noodr egeri ng-15-maart/). 
 8 De Morgen (https://www.demor gen.be/polit iek/reger ing-wilmes-wordt-volwa ardig-minde rheid skabi net~b1522 
967/). 
 9 Knack (https://www.knack.be/nieuw s/belgi e/volma chten-dit-is-de-insta llatie-van-een-voorz itter sbewi nd/artic le-
opini on-15808 01.html). 
 10 Het Laatste Nieuws (https://www.hln.be/nieuw s/binne nland/ belgie-verni etigde-stock-uit-2009-van-zowat-zes-miljo 
en-ffp2-maske rs-zonder-ze-te-verva ngen~a58fe a2c/); Het Nieuwsblad ( https://www.nieuw sblad.be/cnt/dmf20 
200615_04991632); De Humo (https://www.humo.be/nieuw s/hoe-zit-het-met-de-voorr aad-mondm askers-en-waar-
liep-het-mis~b891f 4d3/). 
 11 VRT-Nieuws (https://www.vrt.be/vrtnw s/nl/2020/05/26/kafka-in-de-gezon dheid szorg-wie-zijn-de-9-minis ters-en-
waarv oor/). 
 12 Federal Health Ministry of Belgium (https://www.health.belgi um.be/fr/news/confe rence-inter minis terie lle-sante-
publi que-du-29-avril-2020). 
 13 In February, to obtain a test, patients were required to be experiencing two out of three recognized COVID-19 symp-
toms (i.e., coughing, respiratory problems, and/or fever), needed to have been in contact with someone who had tested 
positive for the virus, or needed to have returned from a recognised virus hot spot. This definition was later loosened 
to only require a limited number from a broader set of symptoms. 
 14 De Tijd (https://www.tijd.be/polit iek-econo mie/belgi e/feder aal/het-versn ipper de-beleid-heeft-mense nleve ns-gekos 
t/10232 910.html); VRT-Nieuws (https://www.vrt.be/vrtnw s/nl/2020/05/22/hotel-coron a/). 
12 |   VAN OVERBEKE ANd STAdIG
 15 De Standaard (https://www.stand aard.be/cnt/dmf20 200529_04976164); BusinessSam (https://busin essam.be/het-
monst er-van-loch-ness-in-de-coron acris is-beke-wil-dan-toch-een-traci ng-app/); De Standaard (https://www.stand 
aard.be/cnt/dmf20 200602_04978907); Raad van State (http://www.raadv st-conse tat.be/dbx/advie zen/67424.pdf#-
searc h=app); Knack (https://trends.knack.be/econo mie/belei d/phili ppe-de-backer-over-de-aanpak-van-de-coron acris 
is-het-is-een-gigan tisch-groep swerk-gewee st/artic le-longr ead-16033 89.html). 
 16 De Tijd (https://www.tijd.be/polit iek-econo mie/belgi e/feder aal/het-versn ipper de-beleid-heeft-mense nleve ns-gekos 
t/10232 910.html). 
 17 Humo (https://www.humo.be/nieuw s/je-slaapt-niet-gerust-als-er-mensen-sterv en-maar-paniek-nooit ~bd58d b16/). 
 18 RTL-Nieuws (https://www.rtlni euws.nl/nieuw s/polit iek/artik el/51203 56/minis ter-van-finan cien-wopke-hoeks tra-
komen de-tijd-geen). 
 19 Breugel Thinktank (https://www.brueg el.org/publi catio ns/datas ets/covid-natio nal-datas et/#nethe rlands). 
 20 European Parliament (https://www.europ arl.europa.eu/at-your-servi ce/files/ be-heard/ eurob arome ter/2020/public_
opini on_in_the_eu_in_time_of_coron avirus_crisi s/repor t/en-covid 19-survey-report.pdf); Maurice.nl  (https://www.
mauri ce.nl/peili ngen/2020/05/17/corona-crisis-onder zoek-17-mei-2020/). 
 21 NOS (https://nos.nl/artik el/23332 69-akkoo rd-over-gebru ik-noodf onds-voor-medis che-kosten-corona.html). 
 22 Noshttps://nos.nl/artik el/23289 51-hoeks tra-te-weinig-empat hisch-gewee st-schou der-aan-schou der-met-zuid-europa.
html 
 23 We are referring here to Dijsselbloem's remarks regarding European fiscal solidarity during the euro crisis. He said 
to an interviewer of the Frankfurter Algemeine that he cannot spend all his money on liquor and women and expect 
the interviewer to foot the bill. 
 24 FAZhttps://www.faz.net/aktue ll/wirts chaft/ wirts chaft spoli tik/nach-inter view-in-der-f-a-z-dijss elblo em-ich-bedau 
ere-dass-es-als-nord-gegen-sued-aufge fasst-wurde-14937 857.html 
 25 NRChttps://www.nrc.nl/nieuw s/2020/04/07/brede-steun-in-tweede-kamer-voor-opste lling-hoeks tra-a3996104 
 26 European Council (https://www.consi lium.europa.eu/en/press/ press-relea ses/2020/04/09/report-on-the-compr ehens 
ive-econo mic-policy-respo nse-to-the-covid-19-pande mic/). 
 27 FAZhttps://www.faz.net/aktue ll/wirts chaft/ wirts chaft spoli tik/nach-inter view-in-der-f-a-z-dijss elblo em-ich-bedau 
ere-dass-es-als-nord-gegen-sued-aufge fasst-wurde-14937 857.html 
 28 AD (https://www.ad.nl/polit iek/rutte-komt-met-eigen-plan-voor-herst elfon ds-hekelt-plan-van-merkel-en-macro 
n~a34bd 674/). 
 29 The Economisthttps://www.econo mist.com/europ e/2020/07/21/eu-leade rs-agree-on-a-massi ve-eu750 bn-covid-19-
recov ery-deal 
REFERENCES
Bache I., & Flinders M. (2004). Multi-level governance and the study of the British state. Public Policy and 
Administration, 19,(1), 31–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09520 76704 01900103
Boin, A., Hart, P., & McConnell, A. (2009). Crisis exploitation: Political and policy impacts of framing contests. Journal 
of European Public Policy, 16(1), 81–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501 76080 2453221
Bovens, M., & Wille, A. (2008). Deciphering the Dutch Drop: Ten Explanations for Decreasing Political Trust in the 
Netherlands. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(2), 283–305. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208 52308 
091135
Camous, A., & Claeys, G. (2020). The Evolution of European Economic Institutions During Covid-19 Pandemic. 
European Policy Analysis, 6. 2.
Capano G. (2020). Policy design and state capacity in the COVID-19 emergency in Italy: If you are not prepared 
for the (un)expected, you can be only what you already are. Policy and Society, 39(3), 326–344. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/14494 035.2020.1783790
Deschouwer, K., & Reuchamps, M. (2013). The Belgian Federation at a Crossroad. Regional and Federal Studies, 23(3), 
261–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597 566.2013.773896
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   | 13VAN OVERBEKE ANd STAdIG
Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Mellon, J., Prosser, C., Schmitt, H., & van der Eijk, C. (2020). Electoral Shocks: 
The Volatile Voter in a Turbulent World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (Eds.) (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Lieshout, M. (2020). In Crisistijd is het Kabinet Eerst Populair DaarnaVolgt de Afrekening, de Volkskrant. Retrieved 
on 26 August 2020 from: https://www.volks krant.nl/nieuws-achte rgron d/in-crisi stijd-is-het-kabin et-eerst-popul air-
daarna-volgt-de-afrek ening ~badc9 b73/
Mueller, J. (1970). Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. The American Political Science Review, 64(1), 
18–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/1955610
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations.New Haven: Yale University Press.
Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 
42(3), 427–460. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020 81830 0027697
Reuchamps, M. (2011). The Current Challenges on the Belgian Federalism and the 6th Reform of the State. In A. López-
Basguren, & L. Escajendo San-Epifanio (Eds.), The ways of federalism in western countries and the horizons of 
territorial autonomy in Spain (pp. 375–392).
Scharpf, F. (2006). The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(4), 845–864. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00665.x
Swenden, W. (2013). Conclusion: The Future of Belgian Federalism – Between Reform or Swansong? 2007–2011 A 
Critical Juncture in the Transformation of the Belgian State? Regional and Federal Studies, 23(3), 36.
Swenden, W., & Theo Jans, M. (2006). Will it Stay or Will it Go? Federalism and the Sustainability of Belgium, West 
European Politics, 29(5), 877–894. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402 38060 0968745
Thomann, E., Trein, P., & Maggetti, M. (2019). What is the Problem? Multilevel Governance and Problem-Solving. 
European Policy Analysis. 37–57. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1062
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Versluis E., Asselt M., & Kim J. (2019). The multilevel regulation of complex policy problems: Uncertainty and the 
swine flu pandemic. European Policy Analysis, 5(1), 80–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1064
How to cite this article: Van Overbeke T, Stadig D. High politics in the Low Countries: 
COVID-19 and the politics of strained multi-level policy cooperation in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Eur Policy Anal. 2020;00:1–13. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1101
